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Mental Space Theory and Icelandic Sign Language
Gudny Bjork Thorvaldsdottir
Centre for Deaf Studies,
School of Linguistic, Speech and Communication Sciences.
Trinity College Dublin

1. Introduction
Signed languages are articulated in space and this is why the use of space is one of their
most important features. They make use of 3-dimesional space and the way the space is
organised during discourse is grammatically and semantically significant (Liddell 1990,
Engberg-Pedersen 1993). The Theory of Mental Spaces (Fauconnier 1985) has been
applied to signed languages and proves to be an especially good method when it comes
to conceptual understanding of various aspects of signed languages. This paper is based
on an M. Phil (Linguistics) dissertation submitted to University of Dublin, Trinity
College, in 2007 and discusses how Mental Space Theory may be applied to Icelandic
Sign Language (ÍTM). First I will introduce the Mental Space Theory and how it has
been applied to American Sign Language (ASL). I then talk about blending mental
spaces and how that can be realized in signed languages. This will include a discussion
about metaphors and blending and body partitioning during blending. In chapters three
and four, each of the above mentioned phenomena will be discussed in relation to ÍTM
and examples to illustrate use will be provided.

1.1 The Data
ÍTM is the first language of approximately 200-300 Deaf people in Iceland
(Sverrisdóttir. 2005). The narratives used here are told by three signers and contain the
signer’s personal experiences. The signers are all fluent signers and active members of
the Deaf community in Iceland. The narratives are recorded and owned by The
Communication Centre for the Deaf and the Hard of Hearing in Reykjavík.1

2. Mental Space Theory
Mental spaces can be described as conceptual schematic images that are built up as we
think and talk. Fauconnier and Turner talk about “long term schematic knowledge” on
one hand and “long term specific knowledge” on the other (2003: 40). The schematic
knowledge can be thought of as a frame, for example, a “…frame of walking along a
path…” (Fauconnier and Turner 2003: 40). The specific knowledge, on the other hand,
contains a memory of a specific event, such as last year’s vacation in Italy.

1

I would like to thank the Communication Centre for the Deaf and the Hard of Hearing in Reykjavík for
providing me with my data.
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Mental spaces, thus, are conceptual domains of meaning. They contain entities and are
interconnected and as are the entities inside them. Once established, both mental spaces
and the entities that they contain can be referred to later. Even though this happens
through discourse, the mental spaces “...are not a part of the language itself, or of its
grammars; they are not hidden levels of linguistic representation, but language does not
come without them” (Fauconnier 1985: 1). Fauconnier talks about such linguistic
expressions that establish new spaces, or refer to already established ones, as space
builders (1985: 17). Words like today, yesterday, in 1977… all function as space
builders in a discourse.
Entities inside mental spaces are linked together using connectors which makes it
possible to refer to one entity in terms of another one. This means that objects of
different nature, such as a writer and his work, can be associated with each other by
establishing a link between them. For example, it is possible to say: ‘Plato is on the top
shelf’ in order to mean: ‘The books by Plato are on the top shelf’. Here, ‘Plato’ refers to
‘the books by Plato’ (examples from Fauconnier 1985: 4). This reference can be
realized using the Identification (ID) Principle, which allows the use of a to identify its
counterpart b (Fauconnier 1985: 3). This is also referred to as the Access Principle by
Sweetser and Fauconnier (1996). The entities linked by a connector are referred to as
triggers and targets where the entity mentioned, is the trigger and the entity being
referred to is the target. In the above example, ‘Plato’ is the trigger and ‘the books by
Plato’ is the target. When the target and the trigger both function as possible antecedent
for a pronoun, the connector is described as an open connector. This way, it is possible
to say: ‘Plato is a great author. He is on the top shelf’, and the pronoun, he, refers to the
target: ‘books by Plato’. If the target is the primary potential antecedent for a pronoun,
the connector is described as a closed connector. This is the case in the next example
where ‘the omelet’ refers to ‘a customer in a restaurant’: ‘The mushroom omelet left
without paying. It was inedible’. Here, the pronoun it cannot refer to the target: ‘a
customer in a restaurant’ (example from Fauconnier 1985: 8).
Connectors that link together mental spaces are always open. An established space will
always be included in another space which is referred to as its parent space and the
established space is referred to as a daughter space. Once a space is introduced in a
discourse, the connector has to be able to pragmatically connect it to its parent space.
Fauconnier states that connectors are: “…part of idealized cognitive models…which are
set up locally, culturally, or on general experiential or psychological grounds” (1985:
10). For this reason, connectors may vary between different cultures, context or even
individuals.

2.1 Spaces in American Sign Language (ASL)
Liddell (1995) defines three kinds of spaces in American Sign Language (ASL) based
on Fauconnier’s theory of mental spaces (1985). The first mental space is the Real
Space, the “…current, directly perceivable physical environment…”. (Liddell 1995: 22)
This space does not include real physical entities but a person’s conception of the
current environment. Thus, this mental space is based on perception. Liddell (1995)
also distinguishes between grounded mental space and non grounded mental space. He
talks about grounded mental space when “…concepts are given physical reality,
including a physical location…” (1995: 22). This applies on real physical objects in our
environment like the cup of coffee on the table in front of you. If you are, on the other
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hand, remembering the cup of coffee you had yesterday, that cup does not have a
physical location and is thus treated as being in a non-grounded mental space. Unlike
other mental spaces that are built up during discourse, the Real Space already exists
because its existence depends on perception of the physical environment and not on
linguistic discourse. Thus, it does not have to be established. (Liddell 1995: 23)
To refer to people and things that are not present signers use what Liddell (1995) calls
Surrogate Space. In this space, signers treat entities as they were actually present even
if they are not. This kind of reference is very common in signed languages and is used
during role shifting (see for example Engberg-Pedersen 1993). This is done for example
when quoting people, the signer will take on the role of whomever he is quoting while
signing the quoted utterance. Entities within the surrogate space are referred to as
surrogates by Liddell (1995, 2003) and he describes them as having “…the properties
of being invisible, being normal sized, having body features, being viewed as present
with the signer…” (1995: 28). The surrogates can be situated virtually anywhere around
the signer; to the side of him, in front, behind, below or above him (Liddell 2003: 154).
There are no surrogates in Real space as it only involves real entities.
Signers often use space to “establish an index” where a place in the signing space is
associated with an entity. An entity can be established by articulating a lexical sign at a
certain location in space or by producing the sign and then point or eye gaze to a
location in space (Emmorey 1996). This location is called a locus and represents the
established entity. The entity can then be referred to by simply pointing at the place
where the index was established. This kind of space is called Token Space. According
to Liddell, “tokens are conceptual entities given a manifestation in physical space”
(1995: 33). Token space is more limited than Surrogate Space. It is situated in the
signing space in front of the signer, circa from waist level up to the signer´s head
(Fridman-Mintz and Liddell 1998: 258). The tokens that are established in this space,
thus, are not “normal sized” as in surrogate space but fit into the limited physical
signing space.

2.2 Blending
By blending mental spaces we can create a new domain of meaning. The spaces that are
blended are called input spaces and the blended space, simply, a blend (Fauconnier and
Turner 2003: 40-41). When two or more input spaces are conjoined, or blended, a new
space is created which holds a meaning that is somewhat different than in the input
spaces even though it contains elements from the these spaces. If one or more of the
inputs is a blend from a previous blending process, the final output blend is referred to
as a megablend (Fauconnier and Turner 2003).

2.3 Blending in Signed Languages
Liddell talks about the process when “the signer’s body becomes someone or
something else” as blending (2003: 152). This kind of blending occurs in surrogate
space as mentioned above. Dudis (2004a/b) describes a conceptual blending process in
ASL. To create a surrogate blend the signer in the physical real space is mapped onto a
person in the event space. (Dudis 2004a: 221) For example, if the signer is describing
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someone driving a car he can take on the driver’s role. In this case the surrogate, i.e. the
|driver|2, is visible because it is mapped onto the signer. The |car|, on the other hand, is
mapped onto an empty space in the physical real space and, thus, is not visible. In a
surrogate blend, the viewpoint of the signer and the counterpart enitity is the same, i.e.
the viewpoints are blended together.
Taub (2001) uses a double mapping system to show how metaphors can be realized in
ASL. This is done by mapping together the iconic parts of signs and the metaphorical
(i.e. conceptual) parts. Taub points out that signed languages “…have incredible
potential for iconic expression of a broad range of basic conceptual structures (i.e.,
shapes, movements, locations, human actions)” (Taub. 2001: 3). However, not all
iconic signs are to be treated as metaphors though, they are only metaphorical when
used to describe an abstract concept (Taub 2001: 21).

2.4 Body Partitioning
Dudis (2004a/b) and Wulf & Dudis (2005) describe what they call body partitioning
during blending. This means that a part of the signer´s body is partitioned off to create a
new, distinct blend. When this occurs, one blend might, for example, include the
manual articulators and another blend includes the rest of signer. These blends then
have to be combined in a megablend in order for the utterance to be understood. This
happens frequently during production of polymorphemic verbs3. Liddell (2003) and
Dudis (2004b) refer to them as depicting verbs.
By partitioning a signer is able to exhibit various different blends during signed
discourse “...and such divisions allow the simultaneous visible representation of
different entities in a grounded blend” (Wulf & Dudis 2005: 321). In such multible
blends one blend can include the manual articulators and another the signer´s face and
yet another the rest of the signer´s body. These kind of blends occur in real space and,
according to Dudis, are “...a staple of ASL discourse”, produced to enrich
demonstrations of the signed narrative (2004b: 224).
A megablend involving polymorhpemic verbs can show two different scenes through
one point of view. One scene involves the surrogate blend and the other involves what
Dudis (2004a) calls depicting blend (the manual articulators producing a
polymorphemic verb).

3. Mental Space Theory and ÍTM
In previous section we discussed mental spaces as they have been described by
Fauconnier (1985) and Fauconnier and Turner (2003). We described mental spaces as
conceptual domains of meaning and observed that they are not a part of the language
itself but rather, they can be thought of as schematic images that are built up as we
2

Elements in a blended space are represented in vertical line brackets

3

Polymorphemic verbs (also called classifier predicates) are a class of verbs that consist of a movement
morpheme and a classifier handshape morpheme. The handshape stands for the referent and the
movement and location of the verb represents the movement and location of the referent. They are thus
somewhat isomorphic with the real world (Valli and Lucas 1992, Sutton-Spence & Woll 1999).
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think and talk (Fauconnier 1985, Fauconnier and Turner 2003). We will now take a
look at how the Theory of Mental Spaces may be applied to ÍTM. Fauconnier’s (1985)
mental space theory includes reference to three kinds of space: real space, surrogate
space and token space. In this section, we will consider how each applies to ÍTM, and
look at examples to illustrate use.

3.1 Real space
As we discussed in chapter two, Liddell (1995) has defined three kinds of spaces in
ASL based on Fauconnier´s theory of mental spaces (1985). The first space to be
described here is real space. Because this space already exists, it does not have to be
established (Liddell 1995). Real space is based on perception, including the addressee’s
perception of the signer in the real physical environment (Liddell 1995). When a signer
is referring to entities in the physical environment by, for example, pointing at them, he
is referring to entities in real space, a grounded mental space (Liddell 1995, 2003). If a
signer is referring to entities that do not have a physical location, he can assign them a
location in the signing space and those entities are also considered to be in a grounded
mental space (Liddell 1995). An entity that does not have a physical location is
understood to be in a non-grounded mental space. A recollection of an entity, for
example, does not establish this entity in a grounded mental space. Since it is being
remembered, it does not have physical location and, thus, should be treated as being in
a non-grounded mental space (Liddell 1995, Liddell 2003).

3.2 Surrogate space
Another space defined in ASL by Liddell (1995) is surrogate space. When a signer
shifts reference by taking on the role of another person, this takes place in surrogate
space. Here, the signer treats entities as if they were present even when they are not
and, thus, surrogates form a part of a grounded mental space (Liddell 1995). In the ÍTM
data, this occurs, for example, when a narrator is describing when she, as a child, came
to the Deaf school for the first time: She is walking around, holding hands with her
parents and looking around (Figure 1).

Figure 1
By shifting into the role of herself as a child, the signer creates a surrogate space in
which she performs or acts out her own reaction at the time. The school for the Deaf is
understood to be of actual size and the signer - as a child - is inside the building. Thus,
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this surrogate space is all around signer, mapped onto the real physical space around
her. The signer’s parents are understood to be present and one of them is situated in the
space to the right of the signer, holding her hand. The parent holding her hand is
inferred as being of normal size and taller than the child due to the fact that the height
that the signer’s right hand is located at suggests that she is holding hands with a taller
person, i.e. one of her parents. The fact that they are holding hands suggests that the
surrogates have body features. It can only be inferred from context that the signer is
accompanied by her parents. It is not until later in this scene that the mother is assigned
a locus on the signer’s right side, holding her hand. The school, on the other hand, is
assigned a locus on the signer’s left side at the beginning of the scene. In this surrogate
space, the school is invisible as it is mapped onto real space, as are the signer’s parents.
The child, on the other hand, is visible because it is mapped onto the signer’s body: the
signer ‘is’ the child.

3.3 Token space
The third space we will describe here is token space. Token space is different from
surrogate space in that entities articulated in token space are not considered to be of real
size (Liddell 1995). Rather, they are situated in the small physical signing space in front
of the signer from waist level to head level (Fridman-Mintz and Liddell 1998). As
discussed in Chapter 2, the signer can establish an entity in the signing space and this
location in space is subsequently associated with that entity. An entity of this kind is
referred to as a token (Liddell 1995, Fridman-Mintz and Liddell 1998, Liddell 2003).
Once a signer has established an entity, it can be referred to again by pointing (Liddell
1995). Much like surrogates, tokens are a part of a grounded mental space (Liddell
1995, Liddell 2003).
Fridman-Mintz and Liddell (1998), note for ASL that when a sign is directed at a
location in space where a token has been established, that location refers to any entity
that is associated with this token. For example, one ÍTM signer begins a narrative by
locating the Deaf school in the space on her left side. Later on, she refers to a
conversation that she had in school with her classmate where they decided that the
classmate would accompany her on a visit to her parents. This whole discourse is
signed in the space on the left where the Deaf school had been established (Figures 2ad)4. It is thus clear (from the fact that the conversation with her friend is co-referential
with the locus for the school) that the conversation takes place in the Deaf school
without the signer having to explicitly mention it. Thus, it is possible to refer to
particular events associated with a token by signing at the location in space where the
token was established.

4

Note that lexical signs are glossed using capital letters.
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Figure 2a, IN

Figure 2b, SCHOOL

Figure 2c, DISCUSS

Figure 2d, DECIDE

4. Blending in Signed Languages
In the last section, we noted that mental spaces can be applied to a sign language
discourse as well as a spoken language discourse. We will now observe how mental
spaces can be blended together to create a new domain of meaning (Fauconnier and
Turner 2003). The spaces that are blended together are referred to as input spaces.
When spaces are blended, this results in a new space being created with a meaning
somewhat distinct from the input spaces. This new space is referred to, simply, as a
blend (Fauconnier and Turner 2003). Sometimes one of the input spaces is also a blend
from a previous blending process. When this occurs, the final output blend is called a
‘megablend’ (Fauconnier and Turner 2003). In order to explore the ways in which this
occurs in ÍTM, we will first have to consider several other notions, including, indicating
verbs, blending and metaphors. We will then take a look at how signers can create a
megablend by partitioning off parts of their body.

4.1 Indicating verbs
Verbs that are directed at entities in space are referred to as indicating verbs (Liddell
2003). These verbs have also been referred to as agreement verbs (Liddell 1990,
Engberg-Pedersen 1993, Sutton-Spence & Woll 1999). Indicating verbs bear
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information about the sender and the receiver of the verb. These entities are included in
the verb’s semantic pole where the sender is the trajector and the receiver is the
landmark (Liddell 2003). In order to understand these two entities it is necessary to
create mappings between entities in real space and mental space entities (Liddell 2003).
If signing I-INFORM-YOU, for example, the trajector (I) has to be mapped onto the
signer in real space while the landmark (YOU) has to be mapped onto the receiver in
real space. On the other hand, if signing I-INFORM-HIM and the landmark (HIM) is
not physically there, then the landmark has to be mapped onto an abstract entity in
mental space. This entity is not visible and in order to understand the utterance, the
addressee must know which entity the landmark corresponds to.

4.2 Blending in ÍTM
As discussed above, the phenomena of the signer shifting his role occurs in surrogate
space. By doing this, the signer is blending different spaces. Take for example the
surrogate event discussed above where the signer is in the role of herself as a child
coming to the Deaf school for the first time accompanied by her parents (Figure 1,
shown again below).

Figure 1
Here, one input space includes the signer herself in real space, the empty physical space
around her and the present time. Another input space, the event space, consists of the
child, the parents and the Deaf school.5 This space also includes the time of the event
being described, in this case, the day that the child went to the Deaf School for the first
time. These two spaces blended together create a third space, the blended space, which
has a meaning on its own, different from the two input spaces. This space contains |the
child|, |the parents|, |the Deaf school| and the time of the event, |the day that the child
went to the Deaf School for the first time|. The fourth space needed to complete the
blending process is a generic space. According to Dudis (2004a: 222), this space
“…serves to guide the counterpart mappings between the two inputs.” It includes
entities from both the input spaces at a schematic level without the blending process
being completed. In this case, the generic space includes two individuals, an object and
the time of the event. The blending process is shown in Figure 3. The blend described
above, is seen from the addressee’s point of view. In the real space input, the only
visible element accessible is the signer as conceptualized by the addressee. According
5

Entities within the event space are italicized
Issue Number 17, May 2008

Page 12

ITB Journal

to Dudis (2004a) the event space is established by the signer during production of
linguistic expressions. Liddell (2003) refers to a blend that includes surrogates as a
surrogate blend.
Real Space
Signer
Empty physical
space around signer
Present time

Event Space
Generic Space
Child
Individual C
Parents
Individuals M and
Deaf school
D Object
(past) the day that
Time of the event
the child went to the
Deaf School for the
first time
Figure 3

Blended Space
|Child|
|Parents|
|Deaf school|
|(time as) the day
that the child went
to the Deaf School
for the first time |

4.3 Metaphors and blending
A conceptual blending process may be used to understand metaphors in sign languages
(Taub 2001). By mapping together the iconic and conceptual parts of signs, a
metaphorical meaning emerges. The metaphor that will be discussed here is the one that
Reddy (1979) calls the conduit metaphor, which says that: COMMUNICATING-ISSENDING6. That also involves that ideas are to be treated as objects and linguistic
expressions as containers (cited in Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10). The conceptual
metaphor COMMUNICATING-IS-SENDING that can be found in spoken languages, such as
English, is also realized in ASL (Taub 2001, Wilcox 2004). Taub (2001) discusses
various signs in ASL that describe communication by using an iconic representation
that corresponds to sending an object to a receiver, i.e. communicating.
This metaphor is also found in ÍTM. The sign x‐INFORM-y7 is produced with a
CL.Flat-o8 on the dominant hand. This sign always begins with a location on the
signer’s forehead but the latter part of the sign changes according to the location of the
receiver (Figures 4a-b). If the signer himself is the one being informed, the sign still
begins with a location on the signer’s forehead and then ends at the signer’s chest
(Figures 5a-b). Thus, the giver’s locus always coincides with the signer’s locus, even
though the signer himself is not the originator of the idea. This occurs because the sign
is body anchored in its citation form. The receiver’s locus, on the other hand, is
changeable and can either coincide with the signer’s locus or be anywhere in the
signing space.
The initial location corresponds to what Brennan (1990) noted for BSL, namely that the
forehead as a location for signs is strongly associated with cognitive processes such as
thinking. Wilcox (1993) noted that in ASL, the metaphor THE-LOCUS-OF-THOUGHT-ISTHE-HEAD localizes signs related to thoughts on the head, especially the forehead (cited
in Taub 2001). Other signs in ÍTM that are connected to thought also have a location on
the forehead, for example, REMEMBER (Figure 6a) and KNOW (Figure 6b).

6

Metaphors are represented in small capitals to differentiate them from sign glosses.
x-INFORM-y = subject-INFORM-object
8
CL-flat-o represents the classifier handshape.
7
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Wulf and Dudis point out that the metaphor is visible already on the articulatory level:
“…the physical structure of the sign represents a schematic version of a prototypical
scene from the source domain” (2005: 325). Furthermore, they state that the iconic
articulatory features that are being used have been chosen in relation to what they are
supposed to represent. The CL.Flat-o in x-INFORM-y, for example, represents an
object being held, in this case, an idea. Literally the sign shows an object being taken
out of the signers head. An English sentence like “I can´t get this out of my head” has
the same realization where an entity, an idea, can physically be taken out of one’s head.
The second part of this sign is not arbitrary either. It expresses an object being handed
over to someone, which is exactly what is happening on the iconic level: the signer
takes an object out of his head and gives it to a receiver. On the metaphorical level
however, it is understood that an addresser, i.e. a communicator, is expressing an idea
to an addressee. Thus, it is clear that this sign incorporates the conceptual metaphor
COMMUNICATING-IS-SENDING.

Figure 4a-b, x-INFORM-y ‘he informs the person beside him’

Figure 5a-b, head: NEG---------dh: x-INFORM-c9
‘I was not informed’
9

c stands for the signer´s locus.
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The two inputs in this blend are the articulators in real space and the source elements,
the giver, the receiver and the object being given. The output, the target, is the
conceptual realization of Communicating-is-sending. Only when we run the blend here
does it capture the metaphorical meaning of the sign: “…composition of elements from
the inputs makes relations available in the blend that do not exist in the separate
inputs.” (Fauconnier and Turner 2003: 42)

Figure 6a, REMEMBER

Figure 6b, KNOW

This is the case here: the two inputs of articulators and source elements do not on their
own bear the meaning of x-INFORM-y and thus, the iconic map on its own could not
carry the meaning of this sign. Looking at this blend, we see that it occurs between real
space and the conceptual elements from the source domain (Figure 7).
Iconic mapping
Articulators
[empty space]
Forehead
Hand forming a CL. Flat-o
CL. Flat-o moves towards
addressee’s locus
Signer’s locus
Addressee’s locus

Metaphorical mapping

Source
Object
Head
An object being held
Giving an object to receiver
Giver
Receiver

Target
Idea
Mind (locus of thought)
Considering an idea
Communicating an idea to
someone
Communicator of an idea
Person that receives an idea

Figure, 7: Double Metaphorical Mapping for x-INFORM-y

4.4 Body Partitioning
When blending occurs during signed discourse, signers are able to partition off parts of
their body and by that create a new, distinct blend (Dudis 2004a/b, Wulf & Dudis
2005). During body partitioning, one blend might, for example, include the manual
articulators while the other blend includes the rest of the signer’s body (Dudis 2004b).
This results in the final output being a megablend but as discussed briefly in chapter
two, a megablend occurs when one of the input spaces is also a blend from a previous
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blending process (Fauconnier and Turner 2003). In signed languages this occurs
frequently when using polymorphemic verbs: the signer’s manual articulators are
partitioned off while producing the verb and this serves as one input in the megablend.
ÍTM signers also make use of body partitioning, for example, as seen in Figure 8. In
one blend, the real space input includes the signer’s body apart from her non-dominant
hand, i.e. her left hand, which has been partitioned off. The event space includes the
child, the parents and the Deaf school. In the second blend, the only visible entity is the
signer’s non-dominant hand in real space. This kind of blend is referred to as depicting
blend by Liddell (2003). In the depicting blend, the signer uses a classifier predicate to
show her and her parents walk up a circular staircase. The blended space here includes
|the signer| and |the parents|. Even though the signer only produces a classifier
handshape representing one person, from context the addressee can infer that it
represents the signer and the parents.

Figure 8
Figure 9 shows how the signer partitions off three body parts to create a megablend. In
the narrative, the signer (as a child) is traveling in a car with her parents. They make a
stop and the scene described in Figure 9 is one of the mother helping the child to pee on
the grass. In this scene we have two blends: first, the signer’s non-dominant hand, i.e.
the left hand, represents the hand of her mother holding the child upright. Second, the
signer’s dominant hand represents the stream of pee and the signer’s mouth represents
the sound of passing urine. The rest of the signer’s body stands for the signer as a child.
Thus, here we have one blend that includes |the child| which is mapped onto the signer
and |the mother| which is mapped onto the signer’s non-dominant hand as well as the
empty physical space. In this blend the signer’s non-dominant hand has been
partitioned off to represent the hand of the mother. Thus, the mother’s hand is mapped
onto the signer’s non-dominant hand while the rest of |the mother| is mapped onto the
empty physical space. Dudis (2004b: 231) has noted for ASL that a manual articulator
may be partitioned off to stand for a second visible element of the same blend.
The second blend in Figure 9 includes the signer’s dominant hand which has been
partitioned off to represent the stream of urine. The signer’s mouth has also been
partitioned off here to create an onomatopoeic item representing the sound of peeing.
The two body parts partitioned off here, the mouth and the dominant hand, are a part of
the same blend. Only when these two blends are combined in one megablend, can the
meaning of the utterance be understood.
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Dudis (2004a) observes for ASL that two different viewpoints are available in a
megablend like the one described above, where one blend includes the signer as a
surrogate and the other blend a depicting verb. In such a megablend, the surrogate
blend shows the participant’s viewpoint while the blend that includes the depicting verb
shows the event from a more global point of view (Dudis 2004a).

Figure 9
In Figure 10 we see an example of two scenes being seen from one viewpoint using
polymorphemic verbs. In this scene, the signer is describing having jumped on a ship
and she is now hanging on the side of the ship, holding the handrails, her legs dangling
on the outside of the gunwale. The signer’s non-dominant hand represents the signer as
a surrogate, with her hand holding the handrail of the ship. The signer’s dominant hand
is producing a CL.legs handshape representing the signer’s whole body hanging on the
outside of the gunwale. The rest of signer is conceived in the role of the narrator. Here,
we have two different perspectives from one point of view. The surrogate blend shows
the signer’s perspective while the depicting blend with the classifier handshape
represents a global point of view.

Figure 10, dh: CL.legs+hang-from-gunwale
nd: CL.bent-B+hold-handrail10
‘I was holding the handrail and hanging on the outside of the gunwale’

10

CL.legs and CL.bent-B stand for the classifier handshapes and the semantic information are shown
after the + symbol.
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5. Summary
We have now seen that Fauconnier’s theory of mental spaces can be applied to ÍTM.
The three kinds of spaces that Liddell defined for ASL, based on Fauconnier’s theory,
are also realized in ÍTM. Real space includes the signer in the physical environment as
perceived by the addressee. We saw that surrogate space occurs in ÍTM when signers
shift reference by taking on the role of another person. When this occurs, the signers act
out the behaviour and reaction of this person and entities are treated as present in the
situation. Entities in a surrogate space are considered as being of actual size and
persons therefore considered to have body features. We also noted the use of token
space in ÍTM. Signers locate entities in space and, unlike the surrogates, these entities
are not considered to be of actual size, but these entities may be referred to later in the
discourse. Furthermore we have seen that is is possible to refer to an event associated
with a token by producing a sign in the same location in space where the token was
established. We saw that in ÍTM, mental spaces can be blended together in order to
create a new domain of meaning. When a signer shifts his role, this occurs in a
surrogate space and the counterpart entity is mapped onto the signer’s body. Entities
may also be mapped onto the empty physical space around the signer.
By using a double metaphorical mapping where the iconic part of the sign and the
metaphorical correlates of that sign are blended together, it is possible to realize a
metaphor in ÍTM. We saw that the articulators in real space and the source elements
can not, on their own, bear the meaning of a metaphorical sign. The meaning of the sign
is not realized until the double metaphorical mapping process is completed. During
blending, ÍTM signers can partition off parts of their body to create a new blend. They
can partition off the manual articulators to represent various entities or they can
partition off a part of their face, e.g. their mouth, to create an onomatopoeic item. The
parts that are partitioned off have to be combined in a megablend so the meaning of the
utterance can be understood. Finally, we observed that ÍTM signers can show two
scenes from one viewpoint when producing a surrogate blend and a depicting blend
simultaneously. The surrogate blend shows the signers perspective and the depicting
blend represents a global point of view.
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